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14 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director of Administration  
SUBJECT : USAF U-2 Follow On Program  
REFERENCE : Project Director's Memorandum dated 26 July 1956  
Concerning Project Participation in the USAF U-2  
Follow On Program

1. In accord with your request I have outlined below my feeling concerning the factors enumerated in Mr. Bissell's memorandum.

2. Within Para. 2 of the memorandum concerned, I would like to express awareness of the factors covering Air Force personnel being trained at supplier plants, Air Force U-2 aircraft being delivered to [redacted] a training program at that installation, the assignment of Air Force personnel to the 14th SAC Support Wing and the proposed activation of the 5th Air Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional at McDill Air Force Base, Florida. There are no major security problems apparent in the program as outlined assuming all Air Force personnel assigned are cleared in accord with standards prescribed by the Agency as noted in sub-paragraph g of Para. 2.

3. Obviously we will encounter a considerable number of problems bordering on administrative and security factors. Some of those readily apparent I have enumerated below.

a. The need for a Project review of Air Force briefing given their personnel assigned to the program.

b. A clear, efficient communications channel apprising the Project of the proposed use, status of Air Force personnel and their clearance certifications.

c. A need for Project knowledge concerning relationship and information released in the establishment of "follow on" activities at McDill Air Force Base. In particular, there is a need for knowledge concerning briefing of key officials

USAF review(s) completed.

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and general explanation ~~the~~ given other base personnel. We should recognize that the McDill facility for all intent and purposes is a Project unit and difficulties encountered by this component as far as the public is concerned are encountered by our program also.

4. In Mr. Bissell's memorandum it is suggested that [redacted] serve as the initial supply depot for the Air Force program with transfer of supplies to a depot in the Southeastern United States. This raises problems concerning transfer and accountability. I believe the Air Force does not have any contract or other records they can use as the basis for Air Force specification documents. While the problems in this transfer may not be of major proportion, it is suggested we explore this arrangement with Col. Gerald Keeling.

4. In addition to the above considerations, I wish to note agreement with the views expressed by the Deputy Project Director in his memorandum, SAPC-8254. From a security viewpoint use of Edwards Air Force Base for subsequent R & D is undesirable. The same would apply to any other Base. The exception would be McDill. A simple review of the problems in establishing an R & D program with the need for explanation suggests a multitude of security considerations. Every time we open a new facility we go through many explanations and expose Project capabilities to curious and potentially compromising reviews.

5. You may recall that during my recent trip to Omaha on the 8th of August I discussed the "follow on" program with SAC officials including Col. John Proctor and Lt. Col. Paul Heron. During a trip [redacted] in July I also had an opportunity to discuss this program with Col. Yancey. From these contacts, and my own observation of areas of confusion, it is my strong recommendation that we consider designation of a liaison representative to Omaha, responsible for facilitating our support of the "follow on" program. In view of the many problems inherent in establishment of the "follow on" program and direction of our R & D efforts it is recommended we also establish a small task force at McDill (probably including representatives of Operations, Administration and Security).

6. The above recommendations concerning liaison personnel are based upon an impression received during contact with Air Force persons indicating their concern that we are indifferent to their problems. There are several factors causing this. The principle one is probably our attitude that this "follow on" program is not ours and at the same

time all major areas of their activity are directly curtailed by our controls. Furthermore, there is a decided lack of clarity in the resulting relationship. This could evolve into a degree of ill will but be easily resolved by a greater degree of personal contact and exchange of information. To this end, I have taken the liberty of establishing an informal communications channel with SAC consisting of furnishing my sterile office phone number in the event they encounter a security problem relating to Project interests.

[redacted]  
Project Security Officer

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